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In 1952, the Ohio State Law Journal published an article on
municipal incorporation and annexation.1 That article was introduced
by the following statement:
This is primarily an expository paper. It is presented as one
step in what the authors hope will be a thorough re-examination of
the subject in Ohio leading to such statutory changes as may be
required to articulate well-considered policy judgments. The Com-
mittee on Local Government Law of the Ohio State Bar Association
is actively concerned with the subject. The members will perform
a substantial public service if they will carry through the primary
study and express their recommendations in a proposed statute.
That the time has come for this study will appear more clearly
to the reader after he has considered the analysis of present law
which follows. To the writers it is astounding that the governing
legislation is so largely devoid of policy content, and that it has
undergone so little modification over a long period marked by
tremendous urban development ...
The author can do naught but reiterate that expression of feel-
ing for although eight years and four sessions of the General Assembly
of Ohio have intervened, nothing has been accomplished in the field
of legislation to alleviate the situation. In fact the basic format of
our annexation laws date back to 18692 and exist today with sub-
stantially the same provisions as were then enacted. While this article
deals with the question of annexation only, it is necessary in such
discussion to refer at least briefly to the statutes controlling incorpora-
tion of municipal corporations.3
The problem of annexation is not one peculiar to Ohio but exists
in all states, in all areas in which there has been a rapid growth of
urban population.
The need for attempting to solve the innumerable problems
inherent in the gathering of population in communities and areas
contiguous and adjacent to municipalities which have been or-
* Assistant City Attorney, Columbus, Ohio. The preparation of this article was
aided by the cooperation and advice of Russell Leach, City Attorney, Columbus, Ohio.
1 Fordham and Dwyer, "Municipal Incorporation and Territorial -Changes in Ohio,"
13 Ohio St. L.J. 503 (1952).
2 66 Ohio Laws 266.
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.03, provides that the Board of County Commissioners shall,
insofar as applicable in an annexation proceeding, follow the procedures set forth in
chapter 707, Revised Code, for incorporation proceedings. Shugars v. Villiams, 50
Ohio St. 297, 34 N.E. 248 (1893).
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ganized to provide for the essential over-all needs of urban living,
has long had the attention of the Institute ...
We have suggested review of annexation laws in the states for
the purpose of advocating changes therein that will promote and
provide the legal machinery for making annexation the effective
device that it can be in solving these problems...4
Recently several bills have been presented to the General As-
sembly to revamp the annexation laws of Ohio but unfortunately
none have passed. In the only area in which substantial changes have
been made, the effect of municipal annexation on the school districts
affected, the changes have only served to compound the problems.'
That is not to say, however, that the law has remained static in the
field of annexation. There has been much litigation over,
and judicial interpretation of, the annexation laws of Ohio. A sub-
stantial portion of that litigation has arisen over the annexation pro-
gram of the City of Columbus. This program has resulted in 108
separate annexations to the City of Columbus since 1952 adding
nearly fifty square miles of territory to that City and increasing its
area from approximately 41 square miles in 1952 to approximately
90 square miles today.6 That a myriad of problems would result from
such rapid growth is readily apparent but that is not the purpose of
this article. Rather, the purpose is to deal with the problems of
achieving this growth. It has been indeed time consuming and
expensive to be forced to resort to 108 separate proceedings to
achieve this growth and to be engaged in the court cases which resulted
from many of these proceedings.
There are four separate methods provided by law for the annexa-
tion of territory to a municipal corporation: (1) annexation of in-
corporated territory on petition of the resident freeholders ;7 (2)
annexation of unincorporated territory on application of the municipal
corporation;" (3) annexation of one municipal corporation to another; 9
and (4) annexation of a village to a city.'" It might be well to com-
4 Report of Committee on Annexation, 1957 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 153, 158.
6 Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.06. This problem is discussed in more detail in the
subsequent portions of this article.
6 These figures were compiled from records of the City of Columbus. Actually,
the program did not commence until 1954, so that all but two of the 108 annexations
have been completed since January 1, 1954.
7 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 709.02 to 709.12, inclusive.
8 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 709.13 to 709.21, inclusive.
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.22 to 709.34, inclusive.
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.35 and 709.36. Ohio Rev. Code § 709.37 provides for a
method of adjustment of boundaries between two adjoining municipal corporations but
will not be discussed in this article. Basically, it provides that the municipal corpora-
tions may by ordinance agree to a change of boundaries so long as not more than five
voters inhabit the territory affected.
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ment at this point that annexation does not constitute a part of the
power of local self government granted to municipal corporations by
section 3, article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, but, rather, is a subject
controlled entirely by general laws enacted by the General Assembly."
ANNEXATION ON REQUEST OF RESIDENT FREEHOLDERS
By far the most often used method of annexation is that achieved
by proceedings commenced by petition of adult resident freeholders of
the territory sought to be annexed pursuant to Revised Code section
709.03. Such petition must be signed by a majority of the adult
resident freeholders of the territory, shall contain the name of a person
authorized to act as agent of the petitioners and a full description of
the territory sought to be annexed, and shall be accompanied by an
accurate map or plat of such territory. 2 Such petition must be
presented to the board of county commissioners of the county in
which the territory sought to be annexed is located.3 The statute
further provides that "the same proceedings shall be had as far as
applicable, and the same duties in respect thereto shall be performed
by the board and other officers as are required in case of an applica-
tion to be organized into a village under sections 707.01 to 707.03,
inclusive of the Revised Code." 4
The territory sought to be annexed must be adjacent to the
municipal corporation to which annexation is sought, but it is not
necessary that the signers of the petition own property adjacent to
the municipal corporation, it being sufficient if their property joined
with other property constitutes the territory adjacent.' 5 But the
signers of the petition must all be "adult resident freeholders" of the
territory sought to be annexed.
Just what the words "adult resident freeholder" mean would at
first blush seem fairly simple to determine. Obviously, corporations,
partnerships, and other types of such entities are excluded for they
have no capacity to be "adult" even if they could be "resident free-
11 See section 6, article XIII, and section 2, article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.
Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958). While this
case dealt with detachment of territory from a municipal corporation, it would seem
that its reasoning would apply with equal logic to annexation of territory to a municipal
corporation. See also: Chadwell v. Cain, 169 Ohio St. 425, 431, 160 N.E.2d 239 (1959),
which quotes authority to this effect; and Schultz v. -City of Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio
App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218 (1950) which reached this conclusion with respect to
annexation.
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.02.
13 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.03.
'4 Ibid.
15 Branson v. Cain, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 146 N.E.2d 892 (C.P. 1956).
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holders.' 6 This means that a great many of the persons affected by
an annexation have no voice-no power-no right-in commencing a
proceeding for annexation even though they may be the ones who have
the most to gain, or to lose, as a result of annexation. The person
who resides in the area but does not own property is excluded as is the
person who owns property but does not reside in the area. Just as
these persons are excluded from signing a petition for annexation,
they are likewise precluded from being counted as a part of the
majority required. Thus, annexation can be effectively blocked by
a very small percentage of the owners or of the persons residing in the
territory involved. In fact, it is conceivable that the owners of one par-
cel holding title in common and residing in the territory could block
annexation of a large area without the other owners (not residents)
and other residents (not owners) having any voice in the matter. It
is less likely that under such circumstances annexation could be
effected by such a minority inasmuch as the other owners and residents
would be entitled to be heard at the hearing upon the annexation
petition before the board of county commissioners and might have a
right to secure an injunction to prevent annexation pursuant to Revised
Code section 709.07.' 7 As stated by Judge Harter in the case of
Murdock v. Lauderbaugh:'5
From an equitable standpoint, it should be obvious that all prop-
erty owners (whether individuals or corporations) should have a
voice in the annexation of their property into a municipality. Such
an argument should appeal to the legislature. However, we are
dealing with the statutes as they are, not as they probably should
be. The power to change the fundamental law in this field rests
with the legislature, not with the courts.
No matter whether a proponent or opponent of annexation, one is
faced by an almost insurmountable problem when it comes to the
question of whether or not a majority of the adult freeholders residing
in the territory sought to be annexed have signed the petition for
annexation. There are many questions that immediately come to mind.
Among these are the problem of proving the number of freeholders in
16 Murdock v. Lauderbaugh, 52 Ohio Op. 135, 116 N.E.2d 815 (C.P. 1953) Contra:
1950 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 283, overruled, 1956 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 97. Cf. 1946 Op.
Att'y Gen. Ohio 795 and 1951 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 547. In the Murdock case, the court
commented at page 136: "The word in Section 3548, Ohio General Code, which points
up the applicability of the rules of statutory construction is 'adult. That word cannot,
in the very nature of the situation, apply to a corporation. To adopt the contention
advanced by the defendants would be to ignore the word 'adult'--to give it no
effect. .. ."
17 This is discussed in a subsequent portion of this article in the course of the dis-
cussion of court proceedings attacking annexation.
18 52 Ohio Op. 135, 136, 116 N.E.2d 815, 816 (C.P. 1953).
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the area, the question of what is the best evidence of who is and who
is not a freeholder, the question of what is meant by the word "free-
holder,"' 9 the problem of proving which of the freeholders are and
which are not residents of the territory, the problem of proving which
of the freeholders are and which are not adults, and many others.20
These questions are most important because the petition must be
signed by a majority of the adult resident freeholders in order that
the board of county commissioners have jurisdiction to act.21 To
attempt to obtain proof of these factors obviously would be quite
time consuming and expensive, depending, of course, upon how large
an area and how many persons are involved. It can also be quite
frustrating as is shown by the following comment from an unreported
opinion :22
If the plaintiff is to be allowed to challenge the board's finding, the
burden of so doing is upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff undertook
a check of the county auditor's maps and the deeds recorded in this
county, spending six days in so doing, with the help of an attorney.
While there was general testimony from the plaintiff that, based
upon his investigation, it was his "opinion" that some of the
persons whose names appeared on the petition for annexation
"were not freeholders," plaintiff was forced to admit on further
questioning that his investigation was to determine whether the
signers had "an interest" in real estate at the locations involved
and he did not purport to define "freeholder." Even if this rela-
tively unsatisfactory evidence were used and given full credence,
there was still no direct evidence from plaintiff, or anyone else, as
19 See 17A Words and Phrases 308, which lists many varying definitions of the
word "freeholder." In the present usage, however, it would seem that the word was
used in the sense of an owner of a fee interest in property, and the word has usually
been assumed to have that meaning in judicial proceedings. A serious question might
be raised, however, over the status of a life tenant and possibly owners of other interests
in real property.
20 The Board of County Commissioners of Franklin County, Ohio, have adopted
Rules of Evidence for Proceedings for Annexation of Territory by Freeholders' Petition
(1954). These provide for such proof by requiring the petitioners to furnish (1) an
affidavit of the agent setting forth the number of resident adult freeholders in the area;
(2) a list of all freeholders in alphabetical order in the area sought to be annexed as
of the date of filing the petition which list must be approved by the County Auditor's
Office; and (3) An affidavit of the persons circulating the petition as to the residence
of all persons who signed the petition. Obviously, a serious problem arises if the
opponents of annexation controvert, by affidavit or otherwise, the proof furnished by
the petitioners.
21 Hicks v. Cain, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 154 N.E.2d 199 (C.P. 1957).
22 From an unreported opinion in the case of McCoy v. Cain, C.P., Franklin
County, No. 198474 (December 27, 1958). It has been held, moreover, that the court-
house records, and not testimony of a witness even if an "expert," is the best evidence
of the number of freeholders. Lamneck v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio C.P. 1955), appeal
dism'd, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 20, 136 N.E.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1955).
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to just how many "adult freeholders" actually resided upon the
territory to be annexed. We might eliminate a few patently im-
proper signatures from the petition but, should we do so, we would
still not have any "total" on this record as to which we could apply
the "majority" signature test. It is tragic that plaintiff's long and
detailed work did not result in competent testimony upon this
ultimate fact; without this significant number, however, we feel
compelled to follow the finding of the board of county commis-
sioners.
Perhaps, this problem of proof of the number and who were adult
resident freeholders seemed easy to the General Assembly in 1869
when this provision was placed in the law,23 but it is far from simple
when we deal with today's urban communities.
As stated above, the petition for annexation must be presented
to the board of county commissioners at a regular session thereof.
24
It is sufficient, however, that the petition be placed in the custody of
the board for the purpose of having that body take action thereon so
that a reading and discussion of the petition at an adjourned regular
meeting constitutes a "presentation. '25 When the petition is so pre-
sented it is the duty of the board of county commissioners to (1) cause
the petition to be filed in the office of the county auditor; (2) fix the
time and place for hearing of the petition, which shall be not less than
sixty days after filing; and (3) notify the agent of the petitioners of
the time and place of such hearing.2 6 Thereupon the agent of the pe-
titioners must cause a notice containing the substance of the petition
and the time and place where it will be heard to be advertised for six
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
and to be posted in a conspicuous place within the territory sought to
be annexed. 27
The hearing on the petition for annexation "shall be public, and
may be adjourned from time to time, and from place to place, accord-
ing to the discretion of the board of county commissioners."2 At
such hearing, "any person interested may appear, in person or by
attorney, and contest the granting of the prayer of the petition."2 9
Affidavits may be submitted in support of or in opposition to the
prayer of the petition and must be considered by the board."0 The
23 See note 2, supra.
24 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.03.
25 Baumhardt v. Mitchell, 107 Ohio App. 209, 157 N.E.2d 898 (1958).
26 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.05.
27 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.05. Franklin v. Croll, 31 Ohio St. 647 (1877).
28 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.06. Shugars v. Williams, 50 Ohio St. 297, 34 N.E. 248
(1893).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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board shall approve the annexation only if it finds that: (1) the
petition contains all the matters required; (2) the statements in the
petition are true; (3) the territory is accurately described and is not
unreasonably large or small; (4) the map or plat is accurate; (5) the
persons whose names are subscribed to the petition are freeholders
residing in the territory; (6) notice has been given as required; and
(7) it is right that annexation be allowed.31
If any of these factors does not exist, annexation should be dis-
approved,32 although the board of county commissioners may permit
the petition to be amended33 which presumably would include an
amendment to correct an inaccurate description34 or map. Minor
technical errors in the description or map or plat may be disre-
garded; " however, if a bona fide dispute may arise concerning the loca-
tion of boundaries, the description or map does not have the degree
of accuracy required by the statute.36 This, however, is an evidentiary
question,31 as undoubtedly are most of the other matters to be deter-
mined by the board of county commissioners.
The board of county commissioners acquires its jurisdiction upon
the filing of the petition for annexation. Of course, if the petition does
not contain the signatures of a majority of the adult resident free-
holders of the territory sought to be annexed, the board would have
no jurisdiction to approve the annexation. This raises another im-
portant problem which has recently been resolved by the Supreme
Court of Ohio. This is the problem of withdrawals and additions of
signatures to the petition. There had previously been conflicting deci-
sions as to whether and under what circumstances a signator of an
annexation petition could change his mind and withdraw his name
from the petition.38 The law is now settled that the petitioners do
31 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.07.
32 Hoye v. Schaefer, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 170, 148 N.E.2d 532 (C.P. 1957), aff'd 109
Ohio App. 489, 157 N.E.2d 140 (1959).
33 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.06; 1949 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio No. 745.
34 Pollack v. Toland, 1 Ohio C.C.R. (ns) 315 (Ct. App. 1903).
35 Turpin v. Hagerty, 12 Ohio Dec. 161 (C.P. 1901), aff'd without opinion, 69
Ohio St. 534 (1901); Schorr v. Braun, 4 Ohio N.P. (ns) 561 (C.P. 1906).
36 Hoye v. Schaefer, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 170, 148 N.E.2d 532 (C.P. 1957), aff'd, 109
Ohio App. 489, 157 N.E.2d 140 (1959).
37 Chadwell v. Cain, 169 Ohio St. 425, 429, 160 N.E.2d 239 (1959).
38 In Lakeville v. Palmer, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 136 N.E.2d 171 (C.P. 1955), it was
held that a signator of the petition had the right to withdraw his name therefrom any
time prior to final action on the petition by the Board of County Commissioners and
if a sufficient number so withdrew so that the remaining signators constituted less than
the requisite majority, the board lost its jurisdiction to act upon the petition. In Lain-
neck v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio C.P. 1955), appeal dismissed, 136 N.E.2d 330, how-
ever, another court apparently held that no withdrawal after the petition was filed could
affect the jurisdiction of the board to act on the petition. A similar conclusion was
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have a right to withdraw their names from the petition any time prior
to the first official action taken thereon by the board of county com-
missioners. 9 Such official action has been taken when the board by
resolution orders the petition filed with the county auditor and fixes
the time and place of the hearing upon the petition pursuant to Revised
Code section 707.05.40 Thereafter, withdrawals of signatures from the
petition is a matter within the discretionary power of the board of
county commissioners 41 and presumably relate only to the question
of whether it is right that annexation be permitted, not to the question
of jurisdiction.
Once the board of county commissioners has held its hearing and
considered the evidence presented, it must make a decision either to
approve or disapprove the annexation and the making of such decision
may be compelled by mandamus.42  If the order of the board is one
allowing or approving annexation, the board shall forthwith deposit
the final transcript of the hearing together with the petition and the
accompanying map or plat with the clerk (or auditor) of the municipal
corporation, who shall file the same in his office. 43 The clerk (or
auditor) of the municipal corporation shall hold the transcript and
other papers for a period of sixty days and then shall present the same
to the legislative authority of the municipal corporation at its next
regular session after the expiration of such sixty-day period.44 The
legislative authority shall then either reject or accept the annexation."5
It is not necessary that the legislative authority act immediately, and
it has been held that a delay of two years and eight months does not
defeat the power of the legislative authority to accept the annexation.46
reached in Roush v. Barthalow, 105 N.E.2d 85 (C.P. 1950), aff'd, 104 N.E.2d 697,
appeal dismissed, 156 Ohio St. 452, 103 N.E.2d 273, where the withdrawal was attempted
after the final hearing was held by the board but before its decision was formalized.
In an earlier case, Pickelheimer v. Urner, 29 Ohio NP (ns) 547 (C.P. 1932), aff'd, 45
Ohio App. 343, 187 N.E.2d 123, the court expressed the opinion that the petition was
in the nature of an offer to the municipal corporation and that such offer could be
withdrawn by the petitioners any time prior to acceptance of annexation by the munici-
pal corporation.
39 Chadwell v. Cain, 169 Ohio St. 425, 160 N.E.2d 239 (1959); Hicks v. Cain,
78 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 154 N.E.2d 199 (C.P. 1957).
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. It would appear from the Chadwell case, that not only may withdrawals
be made, but also that additions may be made to the petition, for the third paragraph
of the syllabus refers to both the withdrawal and the addition of signatures as lying
within the discretionary power of the board after official action is taken on the petition.
42 State ex rel. Loofbourrow v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Franklin County, 99
Ohio App. 169, 132 N.E.2d 259 (1955).
43 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.03.
44 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.04.
46 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.04.
46 Decker v. City of Toledo, 56 Ohio App. 344, 10 N.E.2d 955 (1937).
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While it must be conceded that although Revised Code section
709.04 provides that the clerk shall present the transcript to the legis-
lative authority and "thereupon the legislative authority, by resolu-
tion or ordinance, shall accept or reject the application for annexation,"
the legislative authority is not compelled to act immediately but should
be allowed a reasonable time to consider the matter, there must be a
limit to how long a delay would be permissible. Two years and
eight months would seem to stretch the range of reasonableness to
the breaking point. Unfortunately, there is no statutory provision
setting forth a limit upon how long the legislative authority may delay
in considering the application for annexation. The need for such
limitation is, however, quite apparent. Not only may conditions in the
area involved change considerably after the elapse of a long period of
time, but the petitioners should be entitled to an answer from the
legislative authority so that they may have the opportunity, if they so
desire, to incorporate or to annex to another municipal corporation, if
the first does not want them.
This leads us to another problem-that of the power of the board
of county commissioners to reconsider their decision approving the
annexation. It would appear that this question was adequately
answered by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Maxson v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs of Franklin County,47 where it stated in a per
curiam opinion:
In the instant case, the board had the statutory power and
duty to determine, in the exercise of its sound discretion, whether
annexation to Grandview Heights should be granted and had con-
tinuing jurisdiction to reconsider its decision until the institution
of court proceedings attacking such decision or until the expiration
of the time allowed for the institution of such proceedings (Section
709.04, Revised Code).
From this decision it would appear that the board does have power
to reconsider a decision approving annexation but that that power
ceases upon the elapse of the sixty-day period prescribed by Revised
Code section 709.04 that the clerk must hold the transcript, or sooner
if an action is instituted attacking the board's decision pursuant to
Revised Code section 709.07.48
That decision, however, has not settled the question. In an unre-
ported opinion of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,49 it was held
that the board had jurisdiction to reconsider its decision approving
annexation over two years later where the legislative authority had
47 167 Ohio St. 458, 460, 149 N.E.2d 918, 920 (1958).
48 The aspects of judicial review are discussed, infra.
49 Mariemont, Inc. v. Schaefer, Case No. 6199 (December 29, 1959), reversing the
Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Case No. 203399 (February 26, 1959).
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not accepted the annexation in the meantime despite the fact that
court proceedings were instituted attacking the board's prior decision
and that such proceedings were pending (including a temporary re-
straining order enjoining the clerk from presenting the transcript to
the legislative authority) until two days before the board's new deci-
sion disapproving the annexation, and such court proceedings were
voluntarily dismissed by the opponents of annexation."°
The Court of Appeals"' commented as follows in its as yet unre-
ported opinion: 
5 2
However, we are in accord with the above quoted pronounce-
ment of the Supreme Court in the Maxson case, if it is intended to
embrace the comprehensive meaning that the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the Board of County Commissioners is thereby 53 arrested,
interrupted and held in abeyance pending the final decision in the
court proceedings and, in the event such court proceedings are dis-
missed, the continuing jurisdiction of the Board resumes with au-
thority to rehear, reconsider and revoke its previous decision.
This case is now pending in the Supreme Court of Ohio on a
motion to certify54 and it may well be that the question will be settled
by that court in the near future.
It would appear, moreover, that the same principle with respect
to reconsidering a decision approving annexation should govern with
respect to reconsidering a decision disapproving annexation. Thus,
the board would possess power to reconsider its rejection of annexa-
tion. This question, however, has not been judicially resolved.
If the legislative authority of the municipal corporation rejects
the application for annexation, the statute is quite clear that this ends
the matter. Revised Code section 709.05, provides as follows in this
regard:
If the resolution or ordinance required by section 709.04 of
the Revised Code is a rejection of the application for annexation,
no further proceedings shall be had. Such rejection shall not be a
G0 The City Council proceeded to accept the annexation at its next regular meeting
after dismissal of the prior case and dissolution of the temporary restraining order even
though in the interim the board of county commissioners had "reconsidered" and
"disapproved" the annexation. The case was commenced to enjoin the county recorder
from recording the copy of the completed transcript of annexation and accompanying
papers filed with him pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 709.06.
51 -Court of Appeals of the Tenth judicial District with judges of other districts
sitting by designation.
52 See note 49, supra.
53 By "thereby" it is assumed that the court meant the institution of court proceed-
ings attacking the decision of the board of county commissioners approving the
annexation.
54 Case No. 36567.
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bar to application thereafter to the board of county commissioners
on the same subject.55
It has been indicated, however, that merely failing to pass an ordi-
nance providing for the acceptance of the annexation may not con-
stitute a rejection of the annexation within the meaning of the statute
but that the rejection must be by ordinance affirmatively providing
that the annexation is rejected. In Decker v. City of Toledo,5 6 the
court in speaking of Revised Code section 709.05, stated:
This case does not quite fit the exact language of this section.
The ordinance in question was one to approve the application to
annex, not to reject it. What happened was that the approval ordi-
nance failed of passage for lack of a two-thirds majority.
While this case has been criticized upon this point,5" it would
appear that the reasoning of the court upon the particular facts
involved was probably correct. The ordinance of approval was an
emergency ordinance requiring, as indicated by the court, a two-thirds
vote. Thus, that ordinance could quite conceivably have received a
majority vote of council but failed of passage because it received less
than the two-thirds vote needed to pass emergency ordinances. 8 The
case does not indicate the number of votes the ordinance received
but the statement of the court that it failed to receive a two-thirds
vote leaves open the possibility that it did receive a majority vote.
Under such circumstances quite clearly it would not be possible to
state that by reason of the failure of the emergency ordinance to pass
the council had rejected the annexation. On the other hand, if an
ordinance providing for acceptance of the annexation fails to receive
a majority vote of council an entirely different picture is presented
and the Decker case would constitute no clear authority for the
proposition that the council had not rejected the annexation. If such
circumstances could be clearly established it might be argued that the
annexation had been rejected and no further proceedings could be
had no matter what the form of the ordinance, affirmative or negative.
However, the question is surely debatable inasmuch as the converse
would most assuredly not be true, that is, if an ordinance providing
55 The "further proceeding" which shall not be had if the application for annexa-
tion is rejected consists of the clerk (or auditor) making two copies of the transcript of
the proceedings and accompanying papers and delivering one to the secretary of state
and one to the county recorder pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 709.06. In addition, the
clerk is required by Ohio Rev. Code § 709.011 to notify the county board of elections
if such annexation is approved.
56 See note 46, supra.
57 Fordham and Dwyer, "Municipal Incorporation and Territorial Changes in Ohio,"
13 Ohio St. L.J. 503, 521 (1952).
58 See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 731.17 and 731.30.
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for rejection of annexation failed of passage, it could hardly be said
that the annexation had been accepted. Furthermore, it might well
be that one or more members of council were not opposed to the
annexation but for some reason did not want to accept it at that time
or wished further time to study the matter and thus would vote
against both an ordinance to accept the annexation and an ordinance
to reject the annexation. It would seem, therefore, that something
more definite than the mere failure of passage of an ordinance pro-
viding for the acceptance of annexation should be required in order
to constitute a rejection of the annexation. 9
Upon acceptance of the annexation by the legislative authority of
the municipal corporation, the territory involved becomes a part of the
municipal corporation. Revised Code section 709.10 provides in this
regard as follows:
When the resolution or ordinance accepting annexation of
adjacent territory has been adopted by the legislative authority of
a municipal corporation, such territory is deemed a part of the
municipal corporation, and the inhabitants residing therein shall
have all the rights and privileges of the inhabitants within the
original limits of such municipal corporation.
Thus, the filing of the transcript and accompanying papers60 are
not a requisite to the effectiveness of the annexation.6' It has further
been held that the annexation becomes effective upon passage of the
ordinance notwithstanding a general requirement" that there be a
delay of thirty days before an ordinance takes effect.63 Such ordinance
is, however, subject to the referendum provisions.64
After the annexation has been thus completed, there must be an
apportionment by the county auditor of the funds and net indebted-
ness of the township losing the territory between the township and the
59 See text above note 46, supra, in regard to the reasonableness of delay in acting
upon the annexation.
60 See note 55, supra.
61 Roettker v. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio App. 464, 11 N.E.2d 103 (1936) ; Bach v. Goff,
24 Ohio C.C.R. (ns) 561 (Ct. App. 1904), aff'd without opinion, 70 Ohio St. 508, 72 N.E.
1154 (1904); State ex rel. South Brooklyn v. Craig, 21 Ohio C.C.R. 13 (Ct. App. 1900);
Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ., 48 Ohio Op. 256, 108 N.E.2d 387 (C.P. 1952), aff'd, 48
Ohio Op. 264. The Roettker case states, however, that the annexation may be subse-
quently voided if the municipal corporation refuses to accept the apportionment of
indebtedness and division of funds made by the county auditor pursuant to Ohio Rev.
Code § 709.12.
62 Ohio Rev. Code § 731.29.
63 Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ., 48 Ohio Op. 256, 108 N.E.2d 387 (C.P. 1952),
aff'd, 48 Ohio Op. 264; 1955 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 211.
64 Ibid. The Bd. of Educ. case held that the ordinance was still subject to refer-
endum if petitions be filed within thirty days after passage so that annexation could
be voided in this manner if the ordinance lost the referendum.
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municipal corporation if the territory will not be subject to the town-
ship tax levies thereafter. The apportionment shall be based upon the
proportion of the tax duplicate of the transferred territory to the tax
duplicate of the remaining portion of the township. 5
JUDIc AL REvIEW
Judicial review of annexation proceedings commenced by petition
of adult resident freeholders is provided by Revised Code section
709.07, which provides:
If, within sixty days from the filing of the transcript, map or
plat, and petition in his office as required by section 709.03 of the
Revised Code, the auditor or clerk of the annexing municipal cor-
poration receives notice from any person interested that such
person has presented a petition to the court of common pleas to
enjoin further proceedings, such auditor or clerk shall not report to
the legislative authority such transcript, map or plat, and petition,
until after the final hearing and disposition of such petition.
The statute, it will be noted, is somewhat vague as to the exact proce-
dure to be followed in such judicial review. It has usually been
assumed, however, that once again reference must be made to the
incorporation statutes to determine the procedure to be followed in
such judicial review," and it would appear that this was the legislative
intent.
There are several unusual procedures necessary to commence
such judicial proceedings which can well cause the unwary to be out
of court as soon as he starts although he has followed the usual proce-
dures for commencing an action. The applicable provision provides
that "any person interested may make application by petition to the
court of common pleas, or, if during vacation, to a judge thereof...
who shall "cause the petition... to be filed and docketed in the office
of the clerk of the court of common pleas. ' 6 It has been held that
this requirement must be followed literally in order to confer jurisdic-
tion upon the court and that merely filing the petition with the clerk
in the ordinary manner without first presenting it to the court is not
sufficient compliance.9 In fact, on several occasions, petitions filed
with the clerk but not first presented to the court have been ordered
65 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.12. See Fordham and Dwyer, supra, note 57, at 525-526,
for a discussion of this apportionment.
66 Hacker v. Payne, 7 Ohio App. 25 (1916); McClintock v. Cain, 74 Ohio L. Abs.
554, 142 N.E.2d 296 (C.P. 1956).
67 Ohio Rev. -Code § 707.11.
68 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.13.
69 Craft v. Schaefer, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 548, 38 N.E.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1941); Hacker
v. Payne, 7 Ohio App. 25 (1916).
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stricken from the files upon motion.70 It is not necessary, however,
that the court act formally by journal entry ordering the petition
filed in order to comply with this requirement, it being sufficient if
the court orally or informally order the petition filed inasmuch as it
is performing an administrative rather than a judicial function.71
Another pitfall to be avoided is merely filing a precipe and having
summons issued and service obtained in the usual manner. While
this might be sufficient, it will be noted that the statute requires that
the clerk (or auditor) receive notice from a "person interested" that
such person has presented a petition to the court of common pleas
seeking to enjoin further proceedings for annexation.72 There is some
question as to whether service of summons, even with a copy of the
petition, is sufficient notice to comply with this section so that the more
prudent course is to serve a separate notice of filing of the petition
upon the clerk (or auditor).
There is an additional notice requirement that the person filing
the petition "shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the . . . agent of
the petitioners" in connection with incorporation proceedings.73 In
an unreported opinion it has been held, however, that this require-
ment does not apply to annexation proceedings, the court stating: 74
Admittedly, there was no written, or other notice to the "agent
of the petitioners" of the filing of the petition by the plaintiff in
this matter. There is no case law upon this immediate question.
It seems never to have been raised in Ohio before, and this court,
therefore, has the duty of "pioneering" on this point. Accepting
this responsibility, it is my conclusion that for an "annexation" (as
contrasted with an "incorporation") problem, Section 709.07,
Revised Code of Ohio, governs on the method of giving notice of
the filing of a petition of the kind here involved ....
The notice to the clerk of the city of Columbus contemplated
by statute was given in this case. Since this statute does not even
hint at any requirement that, in addition to such notice to the
clerk, there should be notice to the "agent of the petitioners"
(as required in the "incorporation" chapter, i.e. in Section 707.12,
Revised Code) we hold such notice to the "agent of the petitioners"
is not a prerequisite to our court's obtaining jurisdiction of this
matter.
While Revised Code section 709.07 by its terms states that the
clerk shall not present the transcript, map or plat, and petition to
the legislative authority if he is notified of the filing of a petition to
70 Ibid.
71 Eagle v. Schaefer, 160 Ohio St. 302, 116 N.E.2d 442 (1953).
72 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.07.
73 Ohio Rev. Code § 707.12.
74 McCoy v. Cain, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, Case No.
198474 (December 27, 1958).
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enjoin further proceedings, the usual, and better procedure has been
for the plaintiff to seek immediately a temporary restraining order
from the court. This is true, because if the defendant were to take
the position that the plaintiff for some technical reason was not
properly in court, the municipal corporation may well proceed to
accept the annexation and thus end the matter if the technical defect
did exist. In Naumovick v. Cain75 this very thing happened and the
court of appeals held that the case had been rendered moot by reason
of completion of the annexation by such acceptance, stating:
The record reveals further that while the action for injunction
was pending the territory involved was annexed to the City of
Columbus, no temporary restraining order having been issued
against the appellee.
Another very vexing problem has existed for some time with
regard to who may bring such action to enjoin the annexation. It
will be noted that the statute provides that the petition must be
brought by a "person interested."76 Just what is necessary to con-
stitute a "person interested" has not been clearly resolved yet. It
would appear, and has been so held,77 that another adjacent municipal
corporation which might also desire to annex the territory is not a
"person interested" within the meaning of the statute inasmuch as the
word "person" is defined to include only a private corporation. 78
It has been held that in order to qualify as a person interested
"one's rights must be affected substantially, but not remotely, by the
annexation itself."70 Or to put it in other words: "In order for a
plaintiff to maintain such type of action, he must not only show his
interest in the action but how the alleged annexation adversely
affects his legal rights."'
Sufficient facts to show that the plaintiff qualifies as a person
interested must be alleged in the petition. It has been held that a
75 76 Ohio L. Abs. 208, 146 N.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1950). In an unreported
opinion in Caito v. Cain, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, Case No.
191084 (January 18, 1955), it is stated, however, that "the clerk by operation of
Section 709.07 R.C. was automatically stayed from presenting the petition to council
until final hearing and disposition of the petition."
76 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.07.
77 Cincinnati v. Rosi, 92 Ohio App. 8, 109 N.E.2d 290 (1952); Lockland v. Shaver,
44 Ohio Ops. 189, 98 N.E.2d 643 (C.P. 1950). Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ., 167
Ohio St. 543, 150 N.E.2d 37 (1958).
78 Ohio Rev. Code § 701.01.
79 Markos v. Cain, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 154 N.E.2d 196 (C.P. 1955), appeal dis-
missed, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 20, 136 N.E.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1956); Schurtz v. Cain, 75 Ohio
L. Abs. 132, 143 N.E.2d 496 (C.P. 1956).
80 Post v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Branson v. Cain, 76 Ohio L.
Abs. 21, 146 N.E.2d 875 (C.P. 1956).
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bare allegation that the plaintiff is an adult freeholder and resident
of the township in which the territory sought to be annexed is located
and is interested in and opposed to the annexation is insufficient and
will be subject to demurrer, the words "is interested in" constituting
a legal conclusion and not the allegation of an operative fact.8' It has
likewise been held that an allegation that the plaintiff is the agent for
incorporation of a proposed village which includes the territory sought
to be annexed, without further allegation of fact, is insufficient to
show that the plaintiff is a "person interested" so that a demurrer
must be sustained as to a petition so alleging.82 The "interest" portion
of this requirement has also been referred to as requiring that some
legal right, title, or interest of a resident of the territory sought to
be annexed or of the part of the township that would remain after
such annexation would be adversely affected by the annexation itself.8"
This does not mean, however, that everyone is excluded from
qualifying as a person interested entitled to maintain an action. It
has been held that the words do not require a direct pecuniary interest
in property within the limits of the proposed annexation and that a
person living two miles distant therefrom is a person interested if by
reason thereof his taxes will be materially increased. 4 More recently
it was held in the case of Hicks v. Cain5 that an adult resident free-
holder of the territory sought to be annexed is, by virtue of that
status alone, a person interested at least upon the question of whether
the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the
petition for annexation. The court reviewed and distinguished the
prior cases as follows:
In McCord v. Cain, Ohio Com. Al. 154 N.E.2d 188, Van
Arsdale v. Cain, Ohio Com. P1. 154 N.E.2d 219, Post v. Cain, Ohio
Com. P1. 154 N.E.2d 179, and Watkins v. Cain, Ohio Com. P1.
154 N.E.2d 210, the plaintiffs were adult resident freeholders and
the opinions of the Court in such cases do contain language to the
effect that the plaintiffs had not established "any interest" to
entitle them to the relief sought. In McClintock v. Cain, Ohio
Com. P1. 142 N.E.2d 296 two of the plaintiffs were adult resident
freeholders and the rest non-residents. On the "interest" question,
it will be noted that the Court separately treated the "interest"
of the residents and the "interest" of the non-residents. From a
detailed study of the opinions in all such cases, it would appear that
the Court therein was discussing primarily the question of the
"interest" of the plaintiffs as it might relate to the question as to
whether the annexation was right, just, or equitable, and was
81 Markos v. Cain, supra note 79.
82 Crandall v. Cain, 146 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
83 Lockland v. Shaver, 44 Ohio Op. 189, 98 N.E.2d 643 (C.P. 1950).
84 M v. Siegrist, 13 Ohio Dec. 46 (C.P. 1902).
so8 78 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 154 N.E.2d 199 (C.P. 1957).
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saying in effect that plaintiffs must show that such was not right,
just, or equitable not simply in a general sense, but in the sense
that it unjustly or inequitably affected his rights. In other words,
plaintiff could not prevail by showing that the annexation would
be unjust or inequitable as it might affect the rights of third
persons, so long as his own rights were not unjustly or inequitably
affected....
In any event, none of such cases are clear cut holdings that
an adult resident freeholder is not a "person interested" in the
question of whether the Board of County Commissioners had
jurisdiction to approve a petition for annexation, and if they were,
we would have to respectfully disagree....
By virtue of the provisions of Sec. 709.02 R.C. the Board is
powerless to act except upon the filing with it of a petition "signed
by a majority of the adult resident freeholders residing in such
territory." Whether the General Assembly was wise in limiting
the petition only to the option of adult resident freeholders, is of no
concern to this court. This it did, however, apparently on the
basis that only those who would be affected personally by virtue
of being residents and also affected as to their real property by
virtue of being freeholders, should have the right to initiate such
annexation proceedings if they were also adults. We think it clearly
follows, as a matter of legislative intent, that an adult resident
freeholder in the area sought to be annexed, by virtue of such
status alone, is a "person interested" in the question of whether
a petition for annexation contains sufficient signatures of adult
resident freeholders to bestow jurisdiction on the Board of County
Commissioners to approve the same, and if such lack of jurisdic-
tion be alleged and proved by such a freeholder, he would be
entitled to an injunction enjoining further proceedings under the
provisions of Section 709.07 et seq., R. C.
More recently, it was held that the status of adult resident free-
holder of the territory sought to be annexed is sufficient to constitute
such person a person interested for the purpose of raising any proper
issue in an action attacking the annexation proceedings.8" In an
unreported opinion, the Hicks case was relied upon and extended to
reach the conclusion that a private corporation owning property
in the territory sought to be annexed was by virtue of that fact alone
a person interested, and therefore entitled to maintain an action attack-
ing the decision of the Board of County Commissioners approving the
annexation.
8 7
86 Hoye v. Schaefer, 109 Ohio App. 489, 157 N.E.2d 140 (1959), a1firrning, 77 Ohio
L. Abs. 170, 148 N.E.2d 532 (C.P. 1957). The court of appeals stated simply that: "We
have not given consideration to the question whether the plaintiffs are 'interested parties'
for the reason that it seems so obvious, from the uncontroverted evidence, that they are
interested persons, that further consideration of the question is unnecessary."
87 Mariemont, Inc. v. Cain, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Case
No. 196409 (July 24, 1958). The court stated: "In Case No. 196409 the plaintiff is
Mariemont, Inc., and alleges it is an Ohio Corporation wvith its principal place of
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While it may be that the earlier cases had almost made it impos-
sible for anyone to qualify as a person interested, this case has gone
almost to the opposite extreme. If all of the other cases are considered
together we can see that there develops an orderly and just method
for determining who is and who is not a person interested. Inasmuch
as it is the adult resident freeholders of the area who are by statute
vested with the power to initiate the annexation proceedings, it would
seem to follow logically that those of that class (adult resident free-
holders), who oppose annexation would by virtue of that status alone
be persons interested within the contemplation of the statute. All
other persons, on the other hand (including private corporations),
should be required first to show the nature of their interest (how they
would be affected), before they could qualify as persons interested.
Of course, both other municipal corporations, the township involved,
and any school district affected should be excluded completely from
the category of person interested within the meaning of the statute.
The action, however, is not in any sense an appeal from decision
of the Board of County Commissioners. Rather it is an independent
injunction proceeding. The supreme court has commented as follows
in the case of Geauga Lake Improvement Assn. v. Lozier.88
...The function of the Court in this case is to try an issue
formed by pleadings in an injunction suit, according to the rules
of procedure in injunction suits, to hear evidence and to administerjustice according to that evidence adduced at the trial.
Accordingly, the burden of proof in these proceedings rests upon the
plaintiff and this must be by clear proof other than a mere preponder-
ance of the evidence. 9 Furthermore, it has been held that the plaintiff
must show that he has no adequate remedy at law.9° However, it
would appear that if plaintiff can maintain the other issues involved
he would necessarily have no adequate remedy at law inasmuch as
the injunction proceeding is the remedy expressly provided by statute.
It has been stated, however, that:
business at Columbus, and owns real estate within the area proposed to be annexed.
Section 701.01 R.C., Paragraph (A), reads: '"Person" includes a private corporation.'
We believe a private corporation, such as plaintiff in Case No. 196409, may be a
'person interested,' as contemplated by Section 709.07 R. C., even though it may not
fall strictly within the category of a resident freeholder, or an adult resident freeholder.
Said plaintiff qualifies as an 'interested party,' eligible to file Case No. 196409."
8s 125 Ohio St. 565, 574, 152 N.E. 489 (1932).
81) McClintock v. Cain, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 554, 142 N.E.2d 296 (C.P. 1956); Schurtz
v. Cain, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 132, 143 N.E.2d 496 (C.P. 1955).
90 McCord v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Van Arsdale v. Cain, 154
N.E.2d 219 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
1960]
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The relief by way of injunction, therefore, is dependent upon
whether the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law or will
suffer irreparable injury or in the words of the statute, they must
show that the proposed annexation was not "right, just or equitable"
which makes this an ordinary suit in equity, governed by the
regular rules of equity.8 '
This seems to be somewhat of an oversimplification inasmuch as the
Revised Code section 709.13 provides that:
If no error is found in the proceedings before the board of
County Commissioners, and no inaccuracy in the boundaries,...
and if the court further finds that the limits of the proposed munici-
pal corporation are not unreasonably large or small, and that it is
right, just, and equitable that the prayer of the petition presented
to the board be granted, the petition for such injunction shall be
dismissed.
Thus, it would appear that the proceeding has some of the aspects of
an error proceeding to the extent that if there has been error in the
proceedings before the Board of County Commissioners an injunction
will be granted. This follows inasmuch as the conjunctive was used
above in applying these factors to a situation dismissing the petition,
whereas in Revised Code section 709.13, setting forth when an injunc-
tion shall issue, the same factors are stated in the disjunctive. Thus,
proof of any one of them would entitle plaintiff (if he can show the
other requisites), to an injunction.
It has been stated that in making its determination as to whether
the annexation is right, just, and equitable, "the Court must consider
the subject broadly, having in view the highest interests of all con-
cerned, and not only the present situation, but the needs and growth
of the locality in the future." 92 It has also been held that the ability
of the municipal corporation to provide services to the area sought to
be annexed, such as police and fire protection, is a political and ad-
ministrative question and afford no basis for judicial relief, 3 as is
the fact that there may be an increase in plaintiff's taxes.94
If the court denies the injunction, the clerk shall present the
transcript, map or plat, and petition to the legislative authority at
its next regular session as if no petition for injunction had been pre-
sented to the court 5 If the court grants the injunction no further
proceedings shall be had in the matter but this shall not bar any
future application for the annexation of the same territory."
91 McCord v. Cain, supra.
92 Watkins v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
93 McClintock v. Cain, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 554, 142 N.E.2d 296 (Ci'. 1956).
94 McClintock v. Cain, supra; Hall v. Siegrist, 13 Ohio Dec. 46 (C.P. 1902).
95 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.08.
96 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.09.
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In an early case it was held that no appeal would lie from the
judgment of the court allowing or denying an injunction.97 After a
statutory amendment, the supreme court held, however, that an appeal
on questions of law from such judgment could be maintained. s In
view of the wording of Revised Code section 709.08, it would appear
debatable as to whether it was intended that the judgment of the court
of common pleas should be reviewable. The question now appears
fairly well settled that such judgment is subject to review.99
The plaintiff once more must watch procedure, or he will find
himself losing without the merits being heard. The mere filing of an
appeal does not prevent the municipal corporation from proceeding
to accept the annexation. If the plaintiff desires to prevent such
action, he must seek a temporary restraining order during the pend-
ency of the appeal pursuant to Revised Code section 2727.05, a stay
of execution being insufficient.'00
If the plaintiff fails to obtain a temporary restraining order and
the municipal corporation proceeds to accept the annexation, the
appeal will be dismissed as presenting only a moot question to the
court.101
There is no statute specifically providing for an appeal from a
decision of the Board of County Commissioners disapproving the
annexation. It would seem, however, that the 1957 enactment of
Revised Code chapter 2506, which provides generally for an appeal
from any decision of any board or commission of any political sub-
division of the state, would now confer such right of appeal upon the
petitioners if the board disapproves annexation. 02
97 Hulbert v. Mason, 29 Ohio St. 562 (1876).
98 Geauga Improvement Ass'n v. Lozier, 125 Ohio St. 565, 182 N.E. 489 (1932).
99 Lamneck v. Cain, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 20, 136 N.E.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1955). It has
further been held that the judgment may be reviewed upon an appeal upon questions
of law and fact in view of the 1955 amendment of Ohio Rev. Code § 2503.02 to provide
specifically that actions for injunction are appealable on questions of law and fact.
Baumhardt v. Mitchell, 105 Ohio App. 491, 152 N.E.2d 905 (1958).
100 Franklin v. Croll, 36 Ohio St. 316 (1880).
101 Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21 (1910); Lamneck v. Cain, 73 Ohio
L. Abs. 20, 136 N.E.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1955); Naumovich v. Cain, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 208,
146 N.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1956).
102 Ohio Rev. Code § 2506.01 provides: "Every final order, adjudication, or deci-
sion of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department or other
division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the common
pleas court of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is
located, as provided in sections 2505.01 to 2505.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code and
as such procedure is modified by sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised
Code. "The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised
Code is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law ... 1
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ANNEXATION UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION
The procedures for annexation upon the application of the munici-
pal corporation are similar to those upon application of freeholders.
There are two marked differences: (1) the proceedings are commenced
by petition of the municipal corporation seeking annexation filed with
the board of County Commissioners 10 3 pursuant to an ordinance of
the legislative authority directing such petition to be filed; 0 . and
(2) there must be an election at which all the electors of the unincor-
porated portion of the township involved (not just the area sought
to be annexed), are given the opportunity to vote for or against the
annexation.10 5 This latter provision renders this procedure practically
worthless as a method of annexation. Unless the municipal corpora-
tion desires to annex the entire township, it assumes an almost im-
possible burden in utilizing this procedure. This is true because the
statute provides that if the election results in a vote against annexa-
tion not only are the instant proceedings concluded adversely to
annexation but there may be no further proceedings for annexation
for a period of five years following the unfavorable election.' This
does not prevent the freeholder method from being utilized to annex
the territory during such five year period. 07 Nevertheless, the proce-
dure is unworkable since all the electors of the unincorporated portion
of the township are entitled to vote at the election even though only
a small portion of them might be involved in the annexation.
If, perchance, the election should result in a vote favorable to
annexation, the Board of County Commissioners shall proceed within
ninety days to complete annexation.0 " The same procedure shall
apply, insofar as applicable, as apply to the freeholder method of
annexation.109 These provisions have been held to vest the same
discretion in the Board of County Commissioners as under the free-
holder method, and the Board cannot be compelled by mandamus to
approve the annexation.110 There is one exception to the election
requirement and that is if the only territory involved is owned by the
county, only consent of the legislative authorities of the political
"units" involved shall be necessary to effect annexation."'
103 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.15.
104 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.14.
105 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.17.
106 Ibid.
107 McClintock v. Cain, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 554, 142 N.E.2d 296 (C.P. 1956).
108 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.17.
109 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.16.
110 State ex rel. Loofbourrow v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Franklin County, 167
Ohio St. 156, 146 N.E.2d 721 (1957).
M Ohio Rev. Code § 709.16.
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ANNEXATION OF ONE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO ANOTHER
A rather cumbersome method is provided for the annexation of
one municipal corporation to another, which really amounts to a
merger of the two municipal corporations.
Such proceedings are commenced by a petition signed by twenty-
five per cent of the resident electors who voted at the last regular
municipal election filing a petition with the legislative authority of
the municipal corporation indicating their desire to be annexed to an
adjoining or contiguous municipal corporation." 2 The legislative au-
thority must then pass an ordinance within thirty days declaring its
intention to enter into negotiations with such adjoining municipal
corporation for annexation thereto and appointing three commissioners
to represent it at such negotiations." 3 The other municipal corpora-
tion then appoints three commissioners to represent it 114 and the six
commissioners must then meet and work out the "conditions of an-
nexation."" 5 If the commissioners do not agree upon the "conditions
of annexation" within 120 days, the judge of the Probate Court shall
appoint one additional commissioner and a vote of four of the seven
shall be sufficient." 6 There are no statutory restrictions upon or
guides as to, what the "conditions of annexation" shall contain.
An election shall then be held at the next regular municipal
election or primary election more than sixty days after the filing of
the conditions with the legislative authorities. 1 Such election
shall be conducted in both municipal corporations, except that the
legislative authority of the municipal corporation to which annexation
is sought may consent to the annexation and waive the election unless
twenty-five per cent of the electors by petition request such election." 8
Notice of the election must be given "by poster or otherwise" for at
least twenty days prior to the election and a copy of the "conditions
of annexation" must be mailed to each voter of the municipal corpora-
tion."
9
This procedure may work quite well for small communities, but
obviously becomes very cumbersome, burdensome, and expensive
when large communities are involved.
112 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.24.
113 Ibid.
114 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.27.
115 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.28.
116 Ibid.
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 709.29.
118 Ohio Rev..Code § 709.30.
119 Supra note 117.
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ANNEXATION OF A VILLAGE TO A CITY
The fourth annexation procedure is that for annexation of a
village to an adjoining city. Revised Code section 709.35 provides
as follows in this regard:
When a city and a village adjoin each other, and the inhabi-
tants of territory constituting any part of such village desire to be
annexed to such adjoining city, on application of the legislative
authority of the city and on written request of a majority of the
voters of the territory of such village sought to be annexed, or, on
the written request of two thirds of the resident voters of any part
of the territory of such village sought to be annexed, the board of
county commissioners may cause such alteration to be made, and
the boundaries of the city and the village, respectively, to be estab-
lished in accordance with the application and request, and such
territory thereafter shall constitute part of the city. In all such
proceedings, the board shall be governed by sections 709.02 to
709.21, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
While on the face of the statute, it might appear that only a
portion, but not all of a village may be annexed by this method, it
becomes clear that all or part may be annexed pursuant to this section
when reference is made to its statutory history. The section originally
provided for annexation of only part of a village to a city. 20 It was
subsequently amended to provide for annexation of "all or part" of
a village to a city. 2' In the revision of the code resulting in the
Revised Code the words "all or" were omitted apparently on the
basis that they were surplusage. In view, however, that Revised Code
section 1.24 provides that the adoption of the Revised Code shall not
effect a substantive change in the law, it has been held that all of a
village may be annexed to an adjoining city following the procedures
of Revised Code section 709.35, supra.'22
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION
There sometimes arises a problem where the same territory is
involved in several different proceedings for incorporation or annexa-
tion. 23 Under such circumstances it appears that the proceedings
120 88 Ohio Laws 39.
121 Ill Ohio Laws 405.
122 Clay v. Vigor, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Case No. 193741
(August 6, 1958).
123 It can be gleaned by reading the case of State ex rel. Maxson v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Franklin County, 167 Ohio St. 458, 149 N.E.2d 918 (1958), that the same
territory was involved at the same time in annexation proceedings to both Grandview
Heights and Columbus. In addition, the same territory was included in the incorpora-
tion proceedings involved in the case of Hoye v. Schaefer, 166 Ohio St. 300, 141 N.E.2d
765 (1957) and the subsequent proceedings in that case, see supra notes 32 and 86.
(The 910 acres mentioned in the Maxson case were finally annexed to Columbus late
in 1959.)
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first commenced take precedence and the subsequent proceedings must
be abated pending the determination of the first.124 This does not
mean, however, that the action of the body having jurisdiction of the
second or subsequent proceeding will be void if it considers the matter
notwithstanding the prior proceedings. On the contrary, its action will
be considered perfectly valid, if at the time it is challenged in court
the prior proceeding has been disposed of by a disapproval of the
annexation or incorporation by the body having jurisdiction125 or by
a permanent injunction enjoining further proceedings in such prior
proceeding. 26
This situation results in "races" to the courthouse and confusion
as to the status of territory, it is quite possible to have the same
territory annexed to two municipal corporations or annexed to one
and incorporated as another at the same time. Such status remains
uncertain until all the resultant litigation is completed and even then
the outcome may depend upon which proceeding comes up first for
decision in the court. Such a situation is anything but desirable.
CONCLUSION
It is the hope of the author that this article has presented a basic
picture of the present state of the annexation laws of Ohio. There
has been no attempt to exhaust the subject of annexation. Rather,
the goal has been to point out the problems that exist and the pressing
need for legislative action. While annexation is possible under the
existing law, the procedures are cumbersome and quite time con-
suming. On the other hand, all too often the law does not adequately
protect the opponent of annexation even where he has a valid objec-
tion-it is easy to delay annexation but difficult to prevent it.
The only major change in the annexation laws in recent years has
been in an area that on the surface only indirectly affects municipal -
corporations.
Prior to September, 1955, the territory automatically became a
part of the school district of which the municipal corporation was a
part upon annexation to the municipal corporation. 127 At that time
124 State ex rel. Ferris v. Shaver, 163 Ohio St. 325, 126 N.E.2d 915 (1955); Hoye
v. Schaefer, 166 Ohio St. 300, 141 N.E.2d 765 (1957). In the Ferris case, the court
distinguished Trumbull County Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Van Wye, 122 Ohio St.
247, 171 N.E. 241 (1930), which held that where two boards are given power to act
on the same subject matter, the board first to act under such power acquires exclusive
power to act, on the grounds that the application of this principle is dependent upon
such acquisition being valid.
125 Hoye v. Schaefer, supra.
126 State ex red. Ferris v. Shaver, supra.
127 Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.06.
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this was changed so that, if not all of the losing school district were
annexed, the annexed territory will not be transferred to the school
district of which the municipal corporation is a part unless the State
Board of Education approves the transfer.128 There is a serious
question of the constitutionality of this provision as it would seem to
be an unlawful delegation of legislative power. In any event, the
amendment created a problem vital to any municipal corporation
caught in the web of circumstances. The tax rate on property for all
purposes (state, municipal, county, school, etc.), cannot exceed ten
mills without a vote of the electors. 29
The portion of this ten mills to be levied by each political sub-
division is fixed according to a formula provided by statute. 31 Un-
fortunately, the tax rates for school districts varies so that if an
annexation involves an area in a school district with a tax rate higher
than that of the school district of the annexing municipal corporation,
the ten mill limitation will be exceeded unless the territory is also
transferred to the school district of the annexing municipal corpora-
tion. This, however, by the terms of the statute requires the approval
of the state board of education: If such approval is not forthcoming,
the problem arises-who loses what taxes in order to avoid a violation
of the ten mill limitation? It has been held that, under such circum-
stances, approval of the state board is not necessary but that the
territory will automatically be transferred to the school district of
the annexing municipal corporation in order to avoid the violation of
the ten mill limitation.' In 1959, the General Assembly enacted a
statute to attempt to alleviate this situation by providing that the tax
rate of the municipal corporation would be reduced in the annexed
area only sufficiently to avoid the violation of the ten mill limitation.'32
This may or may not have solved the problem inasmuch as there is a
128 126 Ohio Laws 302. In 1959, another amendment was made dealing with
payment by the receiving school district for any school building located in the trans-
ferred territory, which amendment creates new problems of construction and otherwise,
not the subject of this discussion. There are currently three cases pending in the Supreme
Court of Ohio and one in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County involving
interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code § 3311.06 in its various forms. In all cases, the
Columbus City School District is defendant and the Worthington City, Whitehall City,
Grandview City, and Jefferson Local school districts are respectively plaintiff. Determi-
nation of these cases may provide the answer to the questions raised.
129 Ohio Const. art. XII, § 2.
130 Ohio Rev. Code § 5705.18.
'3' State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Dunn, 165 N.E.2d 247 (Ohio C.P. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 163 N.E.2d 694 (1959). To accent the serious impact of this problem, it
will be noted that the tax loss in the case would have amounted to approximately one
million dollars per year to the city and county involved.
132 Ohio Rev. Code § 5705.311 (Page Supp.).
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question as to whether such system provides taxation by uniform rule
within the municipal corporation. 33 In any event, this is another
area which requires serious legislative study.
The need for legislative study with a resulting complete revamp-
ment of the annexation law of Ohio is manifest. No matter what the
provisions may be it is vitally necessary that annexation procedures
be completely divorced from incorporation procedures so that the
annexation statutes are complete in themselves without reference to
the incorporation statutes, even if the provisions be identical. This
is true because there is no logical connection between annexation and
incorporation. In annexation, we deal with an existing operating
municipal corporation, a "going business" so to speak. In incorpora-
tion we are about to start out on a new venture the success of which
is entirely unknown. An entirely different set of rules should be
provided to cover the two situations.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized the need for legis-
lative study, stating:
It is unfortunate, indeed, that the statutory situation is such
that the proponents of annexation and those of incorporation are
required to engage in races to the courthouse; and the chaos and
confusion which exist as a result of discrepancies in timing and the
parallel jurisdiction of county commissioners and township trustees
should undoubtedly be made the subject of careful legislative
study.13 4
Perhaps, in addition, there should be different procedures for
annexation to a village and for annexation to a city. It is apparent
that the problems of urban life are often not present when a village is
involved and that many unincorporated areas surrounding a city have
a larger population and more complete development than some
villages.
The Courts have attempted to fill in the many voids left in the
present annexation laws and to make a semblance of order out of the
chaotic situation that exists. Unfortunately, as will be seen from the
cases cited herein, there are far too few decisions from courts of ap-
pellate jurisdiction to afford any great degree of certainty to the
interpretations that we have. This is not meant as a criticism of the
courts but rather accents the need for legislative action.
The need is manifest, the problems that exist are paramount.
It can only be hoped that the General Assembly, at its next session,
will undertake a study of the matter and enact a resultant revision
of the annexation laws so that annexation will be more simple, more
sensible, more fair.
133 Supra note 129; 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 813, 813.
134 Hoye v. Schaefer, 166 Ohio St. 300, 141 N.E.2d 765 (1957).
